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Best Interests: The Courts' Polar Star Illuminates
Foster Parent Concerns
State action to terminate parental rights boldly encroaches on the usually
sacred domain of the parent-child relationship and represents perhaps the most
drastic intrusion into this relationship supported by law.1 States do not, how-
ever, interfere lightly with the constitutionally protected rights of parents to
raise their own children.2 Only when parents abuse or neglect their children
does the state's interest in protecting the child become more compelling than
that of preserving family autonomy. 3
When circumstances of abuse or neglect are reported to a department of
social services (DSS), the DSS investigates the report and, if necessary, removes
the child from the home.4 Following removal, the child is often placed in the
care of foster parents. 5 Although placement in a foster home is a popular
method of care for the child until a court can reach a final disposition, such
placement creates yet another set of interests worthy of protection-those of the
foster parents. In implementing the termination of parental rights statute,
North Carolina law relies on the best interests of the child to resolve not only the
conflict between the rights of the child and those of the natural parents, but also
any conflict that may arise between the rights of the natural parents and those of
the foster parents.6
1. "An order terminating the parental rights completely and permanently terminates all rights
and obligations of the parent to the child and of the child to the parent, arising from the parental
relationship .... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1986); see Bell, Termination of Parental Rights:
Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends, 30 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1068 n.12 (1981) (examining termina-
tion statutes nationwide and concluding there has been an increase in the protection of parental
rights resulting from more specific standards for termination); see also In re Gibson, 4 Wash. App.
372, 379, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (referring to termination as an infringement on rights "more precious to
many people than the right of life itself"), cert denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1003 (1971).
2. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (recognizing
constitutional protection of family relationships because of their important role in our history and
tradition as a nation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Justice McReynolds describes
"liberty" of fourteenth amendment due process as including the right to establish a home and bring
up children).
3. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (state has "urgent interest in
the welfare of the child"); see GOVERNOR'S ADVOCACY COUNCIL ON CHILDREN & YOUTH, N.C.
DEPT. OF ADMIN., ACTING ON BEHALF OF ENDANGERED CHILDREN 2 (1973) (providing standards
for intervention in families, removal of children from their homes, and termination of parental
rights).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (1986).
5. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 631 (1976). Professor Wald proposes more restrictive stan-
dards of intervention by rejecting the current "best interests" standard and favoring one which
would only permit removal when the child cannot be protected in the home from serious harm.
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (Supp. 1985). The statute provides in part:
(a) Should the court determine that any one or more of the conditions authorizing a
termination of the parental rights of a parent exist, the court shall issue an order terminat-
ing the parental rights of such parent with respect to the child unless the court shallfurther
determine that the best interests of the child require that the parental rights of such parent
not be terminated.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The recent case of In re Scearce7 offered the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals an opportunity to uphold the "best interests" requirement of the termina-
tion statute in light of recent case law and, consequently, the opportunity to
increase foster parents' influence in such proceedings. The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in allowing the
foster parents to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding though
such a permissive intervention was unprecedented.8 The court of appeals based
its decision on the DSS' failure to show any abuse of discretion by the trial court
and emphasized that the focus of that discretion should be the best interests of
the child.9 This Note will examine the historical development of the termination
statute relied on in Scearce and the practical implications of the Scearce decision
for the future use of the statute.
On November 19, 1983, Dawn Scearce gave birth to a boy in Durham,
North Carolina.10 She released the baby to the Durham County DSS two days
later, and the DSS placed the child in the home of Barbara and Kelly Whitman,
licensed foster parents.11 On February 17, 1984, the DSS filed a petition asking
the district court to take jurisdiction over the matter to terminate the parental
rights of the then unknown biological father. 12 The infant was appointed a
guardian ad litem that same day.13 The father was eventually identified as Jef-
frey Harmon and on May 1, 1984, he filed a motion asking the trial court to give
7. 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).
8. Id. at 541, 345 S.E.2d at 410-11.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 533, 345 S.E.2d at 405.
11. Id. at 533, 345 S.E.2d at 405-06. Prior to signing the release, the mother expressed her
concern to DSS officials that neither the biological father of the child nor his parents should be
granted custody of the infant because she did not feel they were fit and proper individuals to have
custody of the child. Id. at 533, 345 S.E.2d at 405.
12. Id. at 533, 345 S.E.2d at 406; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24 (1986). The statute lists
seven categories of persons who may file a petition to terminate parental rights:
(1) Either parent seeking termination of the right of the other parent; or
(2) Any person who has been judicially appointed as the guardian of the person of the
child; or
(3) Any county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency to whom
custody of the child has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(4) Any county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency to which
the child has been surrendered for adoption by one of the parents or by the guardian of the
person of such a child, pursuant to G.S. 48-9(a)(1); or
(5) Any person with whom the child has resided for a continuous period of two years or
more next preceding the filing of the petition; or
(6) Any guardian ad litem appointed to represent the minor child pursuant to G.S. 7A-
586, who has not been relieved of this responsibility and who has served in this capacity for
at least one continuous year; or
(7) Any person who has filed a petition for adoption pursuant to Chapter 48 of the Gen-
eral Statutes when there has been a determination of abuse or neglect under Article 44 of
Chapter 7A of the General Statutes.
Id. In addition, section 7A-289.23 provides:
The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any peti-
tion relating to termination of parental rights to any child who resides in, is found in, or is
in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child-
placing agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.23 (1986).
13. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 533, 345 S.E.2d at 406.
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him exclusive care, custody, and control of the child.1 4 The guardian ad litem
then filed a counter-petition asking the court to deny Harmon's motion for cus-
tody, alleging that Baby Boy Scearce was a dependent, neglected, and aban-
doned child.15 On July 19, the foster parents were allowed to intervene pursuant
to Rule 24(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 The same day
intervention was permitted, the DSS filed a petition asking the court to award
custody of the child to the biological father. 17 The trial began on October 2,
1984, and on December 31 the court entered its order awarding legal custody of
the infant to the foster parents, subject to Harmon's visitation rights.' 8
The court of appeals held that the record fully supported the trial court's
decision allowing the foster parents to intervene. 19 The court rejected the DSS
contention that Oxendine v. Department of Social Services,20 a case prohibiting
foster parents from bringing an action seeking custody, was controlling.21 In
Oxendine the natural parents had voluntarily released their parental rights and
surrendered the child to the DSS for adoptive placement.2 2 Distinguishing the
case, the court of appeals noted that Oxendine involved standing to bring an
action for custody, while Scearce involved only permissive intervention. 23
The court of appeals bolstered the trial court's decision by emphasizing the
foster parents' statutory right to participate in review proceedings concerning
the placement and care of the foster child after termination of parental rights.
24
14. Id. at 533-34, 345 S.E.2d at 406. The trial court found the biological father was untruthful
and found evidence indicating he planned to release the baby to his parents so that they could adopt
him. Id. at 535, 345 S.E.2d at 407.
15. Id. at 534, 345 S.E.2d at 406. The guardian ad litem filed the allegations because she did
not believe the biological father was fit to care for the child at that time and felt custody should
remain in the foster parents while the biological father was given an opportunity to improve his
situation and establish his fitness. Telephone interview with Joanne Foil, guardian ad litem for Baby
Boy Scearce (Oct. 27, 1986). The motivation of the guardian ad litem reflects the general notion that
upon removal the natural parents should be given an opportunity to rehabilitate and improve their
situations in an effort to have their child returned to the family home.
16. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 534, 345 S.E.2d at 406. Intervention is justified when "an appli-
cant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § lA-l, Rule 24(b)(2) (1983). The court considers whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in exercising its discretion. Id.
17. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 534, 345 S.E.2d at 406. According to the Durham Department of
Social Services, the general philosophy of the DSS is that natural families should be given an oppor-
tunity to provide a home for the child. The preferred option is to place a child with both biological
parents. If the mother is not able to care for the child, however, the first alternative is to give the
biological father an opportunity to prove himself a fit parent. Telephone interview with Daniel
Hudgins, Director of the Durham County Department of Social Services (Mar. 25, 1987).
18. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 534, 345 S.E.2d at 406.
19. Id. at 541, 345 S.E.2d at 410.
20. 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981), see infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
21. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 540-41, 345 S.E.2d at 410.
22. Oxendine, 303 N.C. at 706, 281 S.E.2d at 375.
23. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 541, 345 S.E.2d at 410. "An intervenor by permission need not
show a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation." Id.
24. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-659 (1986). The statute states in part:
(a) The purpose of each placement review is to insure that every reasonable effort is being
made to provide for a permanent placement plan for the child who has been placed in the
custody of a county director or licensed child-placing agency, which is consistent with the
child's best interest. At each review hearing the court may consider information from the
Department of Social Services, the licensed child-placing agency, the guardian ad litem, the
1987] DOMESTIC LAW 1319
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The court further noted that the right of the foster parents to be heard, as recog-
nized in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,2 5 derives from the child's right
to have his or her best interests protected.26 Finally, the court cited a Missouri
court's reasoning that foster parents' right to intervene by permission is neces-
sary to elicit "full and accurate information pertaining to the welfare of the
child."'27 Based on this line of reasoning and the broad dispositional powers
held by the trial court in termination cases, the court of appeals upheld the
original Scearce result.28
To understand Scearce, it is necessary to examine the development of the
proceeding to terminate parental rights since its statutory inception in 1969, as it
has undergone constitutional challenges, and as it has achieved a secure position
under recent case law. The interest of the state in protecting children from a
harmful environment is rooted in the doctrine ofparenspatriae, literally "parent
of the country," which refers traditionally to the role of the state as guardian of
persons under legal disability. 29 The doctrine was incorporated into the com-
mon law of this country30 and became part of North Carolina statutory law in
1919 when the juvenile statutory law court was established, making the clerk of
superior court the juvenile judge in each county.3 1 By the late 1960s, this statu-
tory scheme became, as one conmmentator noted, "obsolete and inadequate in
light of court-improvement legislation that put juvenile jurisdiction in the dis-
trict court."' 32 In 1969, these laws were rewritten under a new title, "Juvenile
Services," and a new section was added that expanded the grounds for termina-
tion of parental rights. 33 The new termination statute was just one portion of an
overall effort to revise and clarify the jurisdiction and procedures applicable to
child, the foster parent, and any other person or agency the court determines is likely to aid
in the review.
Id.
25. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
26. Id. at 841-42 n.44.
We believe it would be most imprudent to leave entirely to court-appointed counsel the
choices that neither the named foster children nor the class they represent are capable of
making for themselves, especially in litigation in which all parties have sufficient attributes
of guardianship that their views on the rights of the children should at least be heard.
Id.
27. In re K.L.G., 639 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
28. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 542, 345 S.E.2d at 411. "Having acquired subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the court, guided by the best interests of the child, had broad dispositional powers, including
the power to award legal custody of the child to the foster parents." Id.
29. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 766 (1982) (state's goal, as parens patriae, is to provide children with permanent homes);
Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives,
50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972) (tracing parens patriae back to the English Court of Chancery).
30. Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child Neglect Proceed-
ings, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 1055, 1057-58 (1975).
31. Act of March, 1919, ch. 97, §§ 1-2, 1919 N.C. Pub. Laws 243, 243, (codified as amended,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1986)); see also Thomas, Social Services, 36 POPULAR GOV'T 78, 83
(1969) (reviewing new juvenile court legislation).
32. Thomas, supra note 31, at 83.
33. Act of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (codified at N.C. GEM. STAT.
§ 7A-289.32 (1986)).
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children in the district court.34
The early United States Supreme Court cases dealing with termination of
parental rights recognized the important liberty interest at stake. The Court in
Stanley v. Illinois,3 5 in response to a due process challenge by the father, held
that he was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before rights to his
illegitimate children could be terminated.3 6 The Supreme Court's deference to
the liberty interest of individuals resurfaced in Addington v. Texas,3 7 in which
the Court found that due process required that a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof be employed when the interest was particularly important and
more substantial than an economic interest.3 8 Although the Addington Court
did not specifically refer to parental rights, it is well established that parental
rights are of fundamental importance.3 9 "In 1979, the North Carolina Legisla-
ture amended [the termination statute] to require, consistent with Stanley and
Addington, that '[a]ll findings of fact be based on clear, cogent and convincing
evidence.' "40 The Supreme Court's deference to parental interests gained a per-
manent foothold in Santosky v. Kramer,41 in which the Court unequivocally
required the use of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof in all proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights.42
Santosky served as the catalyst for a further due process challenge. The
North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Montgomery4 3 held that the court of
appeals had misconstrued Santosky to require a separate and distinct finding
regarding the "intangible aspect of providing for the emotional and psychologi-
cal needs of the child" before parents' rights could be terminated for neglect.44
34. Thomas, supra note 31, at 82-84.
35. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
36. Id. at 658. The Supreme Court in Stanley struck down an Illinois statute under which
children of unwed parents, upon the death of the mother, were automatically declared wards of the
state, without any examination of the father's parental fitness or proof of neglect. "The private inter-
est here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 651.
37. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
38. Id. at 432-33. Appellant's mother in Addington brought a civil action to have her son
committed to a state mental institution. Appellant challenged the trial court's use of a "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing" standard of proof, urging that a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard be
used instead. In describing the "clear and convincing standard" the Court stated:
Having concluded that the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of
due process and that the reasonable-doubt standard is not required, we turn to a middle
level of burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and
the legitimate concerns of the state.
Id. at 431.
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 347, 303 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1983) (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1986)) (brackets in original), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
41. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
42. Id. at 768-70. The Supreme Court held a clear and convincing evidence standard ade-
quately conveys to the fact-finder the level of subjective certainty about his or her factual conclusions
necessary to satisfy due process. Id.
43. 311 N.C. 101, 106, 316 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1984).
44. Id. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
Both Stanly [sic] and Santosky, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, confine their con-
siderations to procedural due process matters. However, the Court of Appeals interpreted
Santosky as requiring a petitioner to establish that a child's intangible, non-economic needs
1987]
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The supreme court reversed this erroneous expansion of the specific due process
requirements, stating that "the Termination of Parental Rights statute as drafted
provides an appropriate forum to address the 'intangible needs' issue, as well as
protects a parent's interest in preserving the family." 45 The requirements of
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, combined with the courts' discretionary
pursuit of the child's best interests, serve as the bulwark of the statute today.
A new constitutional challenge to the North Carolina termination statute
surfaced in the 1981 case of In re Biggers.46 Respondent contended that the
statute was both unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.47 The
arguments focused on two of the statutory grounds for termination:
The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or
more of the following:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child. The child shall be
deemed to be abused or neglected if the court finds the child to be an
abused child within the meaning of G.S. 110-1 17(1)(a), (b), or (c), or a
neglected child within the meaning of G.S. 7A-278(4).
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department
of social services, a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring in-
stitution, and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next
preceding the filing of the petition, has failed to pay a reasonable por-
tion of the cost of care for the child.48
The court applied the principles of the vagueness doctrine49 to the terms
were not being fulfilled by his or her parents before said parents' parental rights could be
terminated.
Id. at 106, 316 S.E.2d at 250.
45. Id. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
46. 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981).
47. Id. at 338-41, 274 S.E.2d at 240-41.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (Supp. 1981) (amended 1983). Subsections (2) and (4) of
section 7A-289.32 now read:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child. The child shall be deemed to be abused
or neglected if the court finds the child to be an abused child within the meaning of G.S.
7A-517(l), or a neglected child within the meaning of G.S. 7A-517(21).
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county Department of Social Services, a
licensed child-placing agency, a child-caring institution, or a foster home, and the parent,
for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has willfully
failed for such period to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child although
physically and financially able to do so.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32(1986) section 7A-517(21) (formerly N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4))
states that a neglected child is one who
does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent, guardian, custo-
dian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical
care or other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment
injurious to his welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat § 7A-517(21) (1986).
49. The Biggers court used principles of the vagueness doctrine enunciated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947):
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"abuse" and "neglect," and concluded the legislature had given these terms a
precise and understandable meaning by the normative standards imposed on
parents by society.50 The court held that the statutory language provides
boundaries sufficiently distinct for uniform administration, yet sufficiently flexi-
ble for application to a variety of circumstances. 51
The equal protection argument raised in Biggers focused on subsection four
of the statute, which premises termination of parental rights on the failure of a
parent to pay reasonable costs of care. "The basis for an equal protection claim
against this subsection would be that it discriminates against parents, according
to their financial circumstances, by authorizing termination of their rights for
the economic failure to pay for their child's foster care costs."' 52 The court re-
jected this argument, however, holding that subsection four fulfills equal protec-
tion requirements by applying the reasonable portion standard to all parents,
irrespective of their wealth or poverty, and by making their ability to pay the
controlling characteristic of what is deemed a reasonable amount for them to
pay.53
After Biggers, the constitutionality of the termination statute was settled.
Further disputes, however, arose in interpretation of the statute. Plaintiff in In
re Ballard 5 4 raised a subtle yet fundamental challenge to the interpretation of
"neglect," which is one of the grounds for termination of parental rights.5 5 Ne-
glect is the most pervasive criterion in the specified grounds for termination and
plaintiff in Ballard questioned the time frame used in determining neglect.5 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court drew a distinction between neglect at the
time the child is first removed from the home and neglect at the time of the
A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law .... Even so, impossible standards of
statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute pro-
vides adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries suffi-
ciently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional
requirements are fully met.
Biggers, 50 N.C. App. at 340, 274 S.E.2d at 241.
50. Id. at 341, 274 S.E.2d at 241.
51. Id. at 342-43, 274 S.E.2d at 242; see also In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 605-06, 281 S.E.2d 47,
56 (1981) (upholding Biggers rationale finding the trial court had erred in dismissing the proceeding
on the ground that subsection (4) of § 7A-289.32 is unconstitutionally vague).
52. Biggers, 50 N.C. App. at 339, 274 S.E.2d at 240.
53. Id. at 339, 274 S.E.2d at 240.
54. 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984).
55. Id. Justice Carlton's dissenting opinion in In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127
(1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983), clearly foreshadowed the conclusion eventually
reached in Ballard:
I believe that the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that when neglect is
to be used as a statutory ground for terminating parental rights, the court trying the termi-
nation matter must find that neglect on the basis of the parent's conduct just prior to the
filing of the petition to terminate.
Id. at 408, 293 S.E.2d at 135 (Carlton, J., dissenting). Justice Carlton distinguished the initial re-
moval of the child, designed to give the parent the opportunity to improve conditions in the home,
from the subsequent termination proceeding designed to eliminate the parent's rights forever. Id.
(Carlton, J., dissenting).
56. See supra note 48 for the statutory definition of neglect.
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termination hearing.57 The Ballard court admitted evidence of past neglect, but
rejected the notion that such evidence was the sole criterion necessary to estab-
lish neglect as a ground for termination." Because the trial court used evidence
of past neglect to justify termination of parental rights, but failed to determine
whether such neglect existed at the time of the termination hearing, the supreme
court reversed the lower court decision.5 9 "The determinative factors must be
the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at
the time of the termination hearing." '60
This distinction between finding neglect when the child is first removed,
and finding neglect at the time of the termination proceeding is magnified when
one considers the different goals of the two proceedings. Judge Becton empha-
sized and assessed the distinction in his dissenting opinion in In re Webb. 61 Bec-
ton stated that "the invasion of the interest of family autonomy-indeed,
privacy-is much more significant in termination proceedings than in temporary
removal proceedings."' 62 He continued, " '[T]he State even has the power to
shape the historical events that form the basis for ["bonding" and, therefore]
termination.' "63 Becton asserted that the intrusion of removal reaches Orwel-
lian proportions when it is compounded with state control of the child in the
interim between removal and termination."' He reiterated the Supreme Court's
concern in Santosky about the disparity between the State's ability to assemble
its case and the parents' ability to mount a defense, and specifically attacked the
court's use of the neglect standard as aggravating that disparity. 65 Use of prior
57. Ballard, 311 N.C. at 714, 319 S.E.2d at 232.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232.
60. Id. (emphasis added). The Ballard rationale was followed in In re Manus, 82 N.C. App.
340, 346 S.E.2d 289 (1986). The trial court in Manus based its conclusion of neglect on its findings
relative to past conditions and made no determination resolving the conflicts in the evidence as to
whether conditions existing at the time of the hearing were indicative of a probability of continued
neglect or whether the previous neglect had ameliorated. For that reason the court of appeals held
that the trial court found insufficient facts to support its termination order. Id. at 349, 346 S.E.2d at
295.
61. 70 N.C. App. 345, 353-54, 320 S.E.2d 306, 310-11 (1984) (Becton, J., dissenting), aff'd, 313
N.C. 322, 327 S.E.2d 879 (1985).
62. Id. at 353, 320 S.E.2d at 311 (Becton, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 359, 320 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., dissenting) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763)
(brackets in original). The phenomenon of bonding has clear implications for foster parents' physi-
cal control of the child.
Where the adult in charge of the child is personally and emotionally involved, a psycholog-
ical interplay between adult and child will be superimposed on the events of bodily care.
Then the child's libidinal interest will be drawn for the first time to the human object in the
outside world.
Such primitive and tenuous first attachments form the base from which any further
relationships develop.
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18 (1973).
64. Webb, 70 N.C. App. at 358, 320 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 359, 320 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., dissenting). In Santosky the Supreme Court de-
scribed the disparity:
No predetermined limits restrict the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting a given
termination proceeding. The State's attorney usually will be expert on the issues contested
and the procedures employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys full access to all public
records concerning the family. The State may call on experts in family relations, psychol-
1324 [Vol. 65
neglect as a determinative factor, combined with interim state control and the
consequent likelihood of bonding between the child and foster parent, substan-
tially thwarts the Supreme Court's attempts to protect the interests of natural
parents in preserving family autonomy. 66
As illustrated in these cases, state control of the child in the interim period
between temporary removal and potential termination poses dramatic challenges
to courts trying to implement the termination statute within the parameters of
due process. Foster parents' physical control of the child during this interim
period complicates the due process formula even further. A number of states,
including North Carolina, specifically recognize the right of a foster parent to
petition to terminate the parental rights of parents to their minor child if the
child has resided with the foster parents "for a continuous period of two years or
more next preceding the filing of the petition." 67 Although the foster parents'
right to initiate a termination proceeding is well established, the standing of the
foster parent to intervene in a termination proceeding initiated by the state re-
mains unsettled.
Few courts have addressed specifically whether foster parents may inter-
vene in a termination of parental rights proceeding initiated by the State. In
Mendez v. Brewer 68 the Texas Supreme Court held that foster parents lacked
standing to intervene in a termination proceeding brought by the State's Depart-
ment of Human Resources. 69 The court reasoned that "the only relationship the
[foster parents] had with [the child] was as agent for the Department under the
written contract to provide the foster home care for [the child]." 70 In Division of
Youth & Family Services v. D. T & J. T,71 however, the New Jersey Superior
Court held that foster parents could intervene and present testimony in an ac-
tion brought by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services to termi-
nate the rights of the natural parents, based on the foster parents' ability to
provide helpful information in determining what is in the best interests of the
children.72 The court noted a trend recognizing foster parent standing in court
on matters affecting their foster children.7 3
ogy, and medicine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing
will be the agency's own professional caseworkers whom the State has empowered both to
investigate the family situation and to testify against the parents. Indeed, because the child
is already in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events
that form the basis for termination.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
66. Webb, 70 N.C. App. at 359, 320 S.E.2d at 314 (Becton, J., dissenting).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24(5) (1986); see also 50 N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. 1, 1 (1980)
("Although no cases construe this statute, patently it confers standing upon any person, including a
foster parent, with whom the child has lived continuously during the preceding two years.").
68. 626 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1982) (court found sole interest of foster parents in petition to inter-
vene was their wish to adopt the child and this made their interest wholly contingent on a judgment
of termination).
69. Id. at 500.
70. Id. at 499.
71. 171 N.J. Super. 520, 410 A.2d 79 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1979).
72. Id. at 526, 410 A.2d at 82.
73. Id. The court cited the recent case of Doe v. State, 165 N.J. Super. 392, 398 A.2d 562
(App. Div. 1979) (foster parents have a right to be heard if they object to an administrative determi-
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New York state courts use a hybrid approach to the issue of standing. Fos-
ter parents cannot intervene as a matter of right at the fact-finding hearing in a
permanent neglect proceeding because it is not considered a "custody proceed-
ing."' 74 Foster parents have an absolute right, however, to intervene in a disposi-
tional hearing when "[ilt is indisputable that the custody and control of the child
are at issue."'75 Like the New Jersey courts, the New York courts have recog-
nized a trend toward granting foster parents a voice in decisions affecting their
charges. 76
Because no previous North Carolina decisions have addressed directly the
issue of foster parent intervention in a termination proceeding brought by the
State, foster parents' status in other custody situations provides the only indica-
tion of how North Carolina courts will treat foster parent concerns. In Browne
v. Department of Social Services,77 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that foster parents had no standing to bring a habeas corpus action to have the
court determine temporary or permanent custody of the children in question. 78
The court based its decision on the wording of the statute at that time, which
gave exclusive control of placement plans to the Department of Social
Services. 79
Six years after Browne, the court of appeals in Oxendine suggested that in
some circumstances foster parents might be able to initiate adoption proceedings
against the wishes of the DSS. In Oxendine the foster parents had requested the
consent of the Department of Social Services to adopt the child, but the DSS
denied the request because the foster parents were of advanced age and because
they resided in the same county as the natural parents.80 The court stated that
nation by the Department of Youth and Family Services to remove a foster child from their home).
D. T & J.T., 171 N.J. Super. at 526, 410 A.2d at 82; see also In re Adoption of Two Children, 170
N.J. Super 320, 406 A.2d 468 (App. Div. 1979) (foster parents have standing to file a petition with
the court to determine whether the rights of the natural parents should be terminated based on
changed circumstances).
74. In re Laura Ann, 82 Misc. 2d 776, 778, 371 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (Fam. Ct. 1975). The court
distinguished the fact-finding and dispositional hearings by noting that the purpose of the fact-find-
ing hearing is only to determine whether the allegations in the petitions are sustained by a fair
preponderance and the purpose of the dispositional hearing is to determine specifically in whose
custody the child should be placed. Id. at 777-78, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94. The more recent case of
In re Marina S., Ill Misc. 2d 898, 445 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Fam. Ct. 1981), clarified the distinction:
A distinction must be made here between the permission granted to intervene in the prior
consolidated proceedings, all of which were essentially custodial in nature and the current
fact finding proceeding. There, the best custodial interests of the child was the sole issue.
Here, only the fitness of the parent is at issue in the fact finding hearing.
Id. at 901, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
75. Laura Ann, 82 Misc. 2d at 779, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
76. Id.; see also In re Marina S., 111 Misc. 2d 898, 445 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Fain. Ct. 1981) (holding
foster parents do not have standing at fact-finding stage of termination proceedings, but do have
standing at the dispositional hearing); In re J., 74 Misc. 2d 254, 343 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (a
fact-finding hearing in a permanent neglect proceeding is not a custody proceeding).
77. 22 N.C. App, 476, 206 S.E.2d 792 (1974).
78. The children had been placed initially in DSS custody after an adjudication of neglect.
They were then placed with foster parents, but upon termination of parental rights, they were re-
moved from the foster home. Id. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 793.
79. Id. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 793. The court was relying on N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1969),
repealed by Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 879, § 7, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1201, 1202.
80. Oxendine, 49 N.C. App. at 572-73, 272 S.E.2d at 418-19.
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the applicable statute, which specified that the agency with custody shall "ac-
quire all of the rights for placement,"8 1 was essentially the same as the statute
used to preclude foster parent action in Browne, which had stated that the
agency "shall have the right to make such placement plans for the child as it
finds to be in his best interest."'8 2 Finding that these statutes were essentially
indentical in meaning, the Oxendine court precluded foster parent action just as
the Browne court had done.8 3 The North Carolina Supreme Court denied that
the statute used by the court of appeals in Oxendine was controlling, but none-
theless affirmed the decision on the basis of section 48-9.1, stating, "There is
nothing in the language of the statute which gives foster parents standing to
contest the DSS exercise of its rights as legal custodian." 8 4 The Oxendine court
went on to say, however, that "the courts shall have the authority to determine
whether the department's failure to grant a petition for adoption was unreasona-
ble and unjust."'8 5 "If a court determines that consent was unreasonably with-
held to the detriment of the welfare of the child, plaintiffs [foster parents] may
initiate proceedings to adopt the child as if DSS consent had been given." '8 6
Despite the denial of the foster parents' standing to seek custody in that
particular case, the latter portion of the Oxendine decision represents an attempt
to balance due process rights of the foster parents with those of the natural
parents as the court endeavors to determine the best interests of the child. In-
deed, the focal point in all termination cases must be the best interests of the
child.8 7 The pursuit of those interests often serves as a justification for the trend
illustrated above in the New York and New Jersey cases, which recognized fos-
ter parents' rights with respect to their foster children.88 The North Carolina
Supreme Court in In re Shue 8 9 expressed a similar opinion, stating, "whenever
the trial court is determining the best interest of a child, any evidence which is
competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of the child must be
heard and considered by the trial court...." 90 Moreover, in Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families,9 1 the United States Supreme Court held that foster par-
ents who attack state procedures have standing to assert, under the fourteenth
81. Id. at 577, 272 S.E.2d at 421. The court was relying on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33
(1977), repealed by Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 815, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966, 966.
82. Browne, 22 N.C. App. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 793. The court was relying on N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-288 (1969), repealed by Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 879, § 7, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1201,
1202.
83. Oxendine, 303 N.C. at 708, 281 S.E.2d at 376.
84. Id. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375. Section 48-9.1(1) states that legal custody is in DSS if the
child is surrendered and consent has been given to DSS. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9.1(1) (1984).
85. Oxendine, 303 N.C. at 708, 281 S.E.2d at 376.
86. Id. at 709, 281 S.E.2d at 376.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.22(3) (1986); see, ag., In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109,
316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984) (describing the best interests of the child as the "polar star").
88. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 76. A New York court concluded that foster par-
ents have a right to be heard, which derives from the protection of the child's best interests. Gold-
stein v. Lavine, 100 Misc. 2d 126, 133, 418 N.Y.S.2d 845, 851 (1979).
89. 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
90. Id. at 597, 319 S.E.2d at 574.
91. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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amendment, liberty rights in their preserving their family unit.92 The best inter-
ests of the child thus may sway the North Carolina courts to exercise their dis-
cretion in favor of improving foster parent status in termination cases.
The proceeding to terminate parental rights, although a drastic limitation
of a fundamental interest, has nonetheless withstood numerous constitutional
challenges. Although North Carolina courts now require a termination order to
be based on "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence, the basic premise of the
statute remains intact; the best interests of the child continue to be the pivotal
factor in resolving all termination cases. Because the best interests of the child
must prevail over the interests of natural parents or foster parents, the adult
interests that correspond more closely with the court's determination of the
child's best interests will likely prevail. Court discretion obviously plays a stra-
tegic role when an inherently subjective criterion like "best interests" must be
determined. The Scearce litigation illustrates this point and implies that to make
an intelligent and informed determination of the child's best interests, courts
may be inclined to permit foster parent intervention rather than risk ignorance
about relevant evidence of the child's life.93
Scearce initially adhered to the typical scheme of a termination of parental
rights proceeding and incorporated its most potent elements. The DSS insti-
tuted an action to terminate, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the
child, and the guardian alleged neglect and abandonment by the biological fa-
ther.94 Only when the foster parents intervened with the court's permission, and
the DSS changed camps to support the biological father whose parental rights
they had intended to sever, did the case take on a dramatically different agenda.
Despite the drastic turn of events after intervention, the Scearce case as a
whole incorporates many of the elements of its more typical predecessors. First,
Judge Cozort used the clear, cogent, and convincing standard, adopted by the
North Carolina General Assembly in response to Stanley and Addington,95 to
hold that the district court's findings of fact were properly supported by the
evidence. 96 Second, the Scearce court evaluated the evidence of neglect and
abandonment as specified by the criteria enumerated in the termination statute
and upheld as constitutional in Biggers and Montgomery. Specifically, the court
described the father's neglect in terms of sporadic support payments, missed
visits with the infant, and a general failure "to show any interest whatsoever in
said child's health and welfare."'97 This description directly parallels the lan-
guage of the statute.98 Although the Scearce decision did not culminate in an
actual termination of parental rights, it did rely on those elements of the statute
held constitutional in Biggers and Montgomery.99
92. Id. at 842 & n.45.
93. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 541, 345 S.E.2d at 410.
94. Id. at 533-34, 345 S.E.2d at 406.
95. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
96. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 532, 345 S.E.2d at 405.
97. Id. at 536, 345 S.E.2d at 407.
98. See supra note 48 for the text of the statute.
99. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 535-36, 345 S.E.2d at 407.
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Scearce is significant primarily in that it allows foster parent intervention in
a state-initiated proceeding to terminate parental rights, despite the prior ten-
dency of North Carolina courts to support the DSS in custody-type proceedings
in which the rights of foster parents conflict with the wishes of the depart-
ment. 10 The statute governing the effects of surrender and consent given to the
DSS states that legal custody will be in the DSS unless otherwise ordered by the
court.10 1 In Oxendine the court focused on the portion of this statute giving the
DSS legal custody.' 0 2 The Scearce court focused instead on the portion of the
statute allowing the court to order otherwise and took full advantage of its broad
dispositional powers. 10 3 The court distinguished Oxendine as a case in which
foster parents sought to bring an action for custody, rather than to intervene
permissively. The disparate treatment of the foster parents in these two situa-
tions, however, may also be explained by the court's ultimate goal-the best
interests of the child. The Scearce court used its discretion to allow foster parent
intervention because it was convinced the best interests of the child would be
served by such intervention.104
Trial court discretion and the best interests of the child do not provide a
particularly precise explanation for the Scearce decision, however, and the ter-
mination statute itself provides little to support the specific conclusion the court
reached. One portion of the statute clearly recognizes the right of a foster parent
to petition for termination of parental rights, but only if the foster child has lived
in the foster home for more than two years. 10 5 The foster child in Scearce had
lived only three months with the foster parents when the DSS brought the ac-
tion, and only eight months when the foster parents were permitted to inter-
vene.10 6 Clearly, the foster parents in Scearce could not have petitioned for
termination of parental rights in accordance with the statute. Intervention thus
achieved a result the foster parents could not have realized by direct action.
Furthermore, even if a statute did permit foster parents to petition for termina-
tion of parental rights, a court could nevertheless deny foster parent intervention
in a proceeding initiated by a state agency.10 7 The Scearce court tried to support
its position by analogy to the more peripheral portions of the statute.10 8 One
such portion recognized the right of the foster parents to participate in review
100. See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9.1 (1984).
102. Oxendine, 303 N.C. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375.
103. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 542, 345 S.E.2d at 411.
104. Id. at 542-43, 345 S.E.2d at 411.
105. Section 7A-289.24 states in part that "[a] petition to terminate the parental rights of either
or both parents to his, her, or their minor child may only be filed by:... [a]ny person with whom the
child has resided for a continuous period of two years or more next preceding the filing of the
petition. . " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.24 (1986).
106. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 533-34, 345 S.E.2d at 405-06.
107. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in Harris County Child Welfare Unit v. Caloudas, 590
S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), found that foster parents had standing to petition for termi-
nation of the rights of the natural parents when the child had been in their care for two years, based
on a state statute. In Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1982), however, the Texas
Supreme Court refused to allow foster parents to intervene in a proceeding, brought by the Depart-
ment of Human Resources, to terminate parental rights.
108. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 540-41, 345 S.E.2d at 409-11.
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proceedings concerning the placement and care of the foster child after termina-
tion of parental rights.109 This supports the notion that foster parents have a
right to be heard once termination is completed, but Scearce involved foster par-
ent intervention prior to termination. 110
The New York courts distinguish between the fact-finding and dispositional
portions of a termination proceeding and allow foster parents to participate in
the latter.1 11 Because the father in Scearce was unidentified at the time the
mother surrendered the child, much factfinding was required in the Scearce liti-
gation, 112 which also culminated in a dispositional decision.1 13 Allowing the
foster parents to intervene in such a proceeding may indicate a discretionary
adoption in North Carolina of the trends noted in New York and New Jersey
toward recognizing foster parents' rights in their charges.
Despite the difficulty in precisely identifying statutory support for the
Scearce court's conclusions, the decision has serious implications for future use
of the statute. If permissive intervention by foster parents is routinely allowed
prior to an order to terminate, the State's power to control the history of termi-
nation cases will likely be enhanced, and the disparity between the State's power
to assemble its case and the natural parents' ability to mount a defense will be
magnified. The Ballard requirement of finding neglect at the time of the termi-
nation proceeding may be practically emasculated as a safeguard of the rights of
the natural parents when foster parents are allowed to intervene in termination
proceedings. The attempts of natural parents to show that they have improved
their situations enough to warrant a return of their child will face a powerful
counterforce in the form of foster parent presence at the hearings.
Judge Becton, dissenting in Webb, provided a description of how strong a
force foster care can be against natural parents' honest efforts to reform.
Given the tender ages of the children involved in most of these cases
and the length of time it generally takes from temporary removal to
termination,.., bonding between the child and the foster parents is
likely to occur and is, therefore, likely to be unduly weighted when
balanced against the interest of parents who simply may have been
careless, immature, and not mean at all. When the best interest of the
child is weighed on the scales of justice, it is wrong to place the heavy
thumb of bonding on the side of the foster parents, especially when the
parents have not even been given the opportunity to apply admittedly
learned parenting skills.114
The Scearce decision is likely to make the "heavy thumb of bonding" at least as
potent a force for natural parents to reckon with as their own previous neglectful
behavior.
The only way to reconcile the fears expressed in Ballard and Judge Becton's
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-659(a) (1986).
110. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 534, 345 S.E.2d at 406.
111. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
112. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 534-36, 345 S.E.2d at 406-07.
113. Id. at 543, 345 S.E.2d at 411.
114. Webb, 70 N.C. App. at 359, 320 S.E.2d at 314-15 (Becton, J., dissenting).
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dissent in Webb with the court's decision in Scearce is to rely once again on the
elusive focal point in all these cases-the best interests of the child. "Although
courts should balance the parents' inherent right to maintain their family unit
with the welfare of the minor child, it is the latter that should always prevail, if
it is determined that the two interests are conflicting."'1 15 In the opinion of the
Scearce court, foster parent intervention provided evidence of the child's best
interests, and thus could not be denied.1 16 Although the trial court concluded
and the court of appeals agreed that intervention by the foster parents would not
"prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties," the best inter-
ests rationale was the prevailing factor in the court's determination.' 17 Scearce
can best be characterized as a tool to define and shape the trial court's role in
applying the best interests standard. By allowing the foster parents to intervene,
the Scearce court indicated that the court's exposure to all available information
was essential to determine the best interests of the child.' 18 Although this is not
a precise formulation of the best interests standard, it does indicate the court's
willingness to adopt a more liberal approach in searching for the fulfillment of
that standard. Because foster parents' physical control of the child is a signifi-
cant facet of the child's life, it is only reasonable for courts to treat awareness of
this facet as an important piece in the best interests puzzle the court is asked to
solve.
DANIEL W. CLARK
115. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116, 316 S.E.2d at 256. The goal of state intervention has tradi-
tionally been the best interests of the child, but implementation of this goal has proved problematic.
In giving meaning to [the best interests] goal, decisionmakers in law have recognized the
necessity of protecting a child's physical well-being as a guide to placement. But they have
been slow to understand and to acknowledge the necessity of safeguarding a child's psycho-
logical well-being. While they make the interests of a child paramount over all other
claims when his physical well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate, often intentionally,
his psychological well-being to, for example, an adult's right to assert a biological tie. Yet
both well-beings are equally important, and any sharp distinction between them is artificial.
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNrr, supra note 63, at 4.
116. Scearce, 81 N.C. App. at 540-41, 345 S.E.2d at 410.
117. Id. The court admitted that the foster parents did not advocate the position of the father or
DSS and concentrated instead on the best interests argument.
118. Id.
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